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Abstract   
 
This paper examines the conversion decision of a landowner from an undeveloped or agricultural 
use to a subdivision in the presence of an active housing market and an active land preservation 
program. It utilizes a unique panel dataset and incorporates a real options framework to evaluate 
the impacts of housing market volatility on conversion timing. At the same time, it evaluates the 
impact of a preservation program on the timing of conversion. A delayed conversion decision is 
a desirable outcome for the county even if parcels ultimately convert to a developed state. 
Hazard models are estimated which account for multiple exit states, i.e. competing risks, of 
conversion or preservation and correlation among these competing risks is modeled. Results of 
these models suggest that price volatility, as well as eligibility for the preservation program, 
significantly delays conversion decisions. The median estimated delay induced by easement 
eligibility ranges from 7 years to over 20 years depending on parcel size. 
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Introduction and Policy Environment 
There has been much discussion about the pace of land use change in recent decades 
especially in ex-urban areas of the country.
1   In many areas land use change has taken the form 
of forest or farmland converting to low density residential use. Although accurate statistics are 
difficult to obtain about the rate or amount of conversion in any particular area, the level of 
concern expressed by local governments in many states provides, at a minimum, indirect 
evidence for the prevalence of this land conversion issue. Many local governments have 
responded to this conversion activity by implementing policies to preserve land in open space 
(farmland) or by enacting regulations to slow the pace of development; some have done both. 
These measures, unlike many government programs, are both expensive and popular. Since 
1988, over 53 localities have passed more than $111 billion in conservation measures and these 
referenda have been exceedingly popular with over 75% of such measures passing (Trust for 
Public Land, 2007).  
   Because directly regulating development is both politically and legally difficult, 
jurisdictions are looking toward incentive based mechanisms to manage the pace and pattern of 
urban growth and the conversion of agricultural land. Under one such mechanism, landowners 
voluntarily receive payment for agreeing to forego conversion and accept easements placed on 
their land. Since the first purchase of development rights (PDR) program was implemented in 
1974, over 53 state and local governments have collectively spent more than $3 billion in public 
funds to preserve nearly 2 million acres in the U.S. Of this preserved acreage approximately 1 
million acres are preserved as farmland preservation easements on over 7,100 farms (Sokolow, 
2007).  
Given the significant costs involved in preserving farmland, government agencies and 
academics are increasingly interested in the effectiveness of PDR programs and this interest has 
led to several studies analyzing various impacts of land preservation programs. Most closely 
related to this work are those that have considered the effects of preservation programs on rates 
of urban development (Lynch and Carpenter, 2003; Lynch and Liu, 2007). These studies found 
limited evidence that preservation programs slow land conversion rates. Results from other 
studies suggest that PDR programs may actually hasten the development of adjacent parcels by 
                                                 
1 Exurban areas are defined as locations outside of metropolitan areas but within their ‘commuter-sheds’. Virtually 
all of Howard County meets this definition.   4
making land more valuable in residential use, due to a positive spillover effect (e.g., Irwin, 1998; 
Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz, 2003; Roe, Irwin, and Murrow-
Jones, 2004). Still others have focused on characterizing the decision to participate in PDR 
programs (e.g., Nickerson, 2000; Lynch and Lovell, 2003; Duke, 2004) or evaluating efficiency 
and distributional aspects of these programs (Lynch and Musser, 2001). Until recently, no studies 
had explored the effects of the existence of PDR programs on land development decisions 
themselves. That is, does the additional option of preservation affect the decision to convert? 
Towe, Nickerson and Bockstael (2008) do consider the impacts of a preservation program on 
conversion decisions but they implement a class of models that is potentially inadequate to fully 
describe the conversion decision. This paper implements a more appropriate econometric 
methodology than Towe, Nickerson, and Bockstael by using a class of hazard models that 
account for two primary shortfalls of the previous work, incorporation of multiple exit states 
(conversion or preservation) and unobservable heterogeneity induced by landowner attributes 
and parcel attributes. These models are constructed in the framework of a real options model 
which closely mimics the true decision environment facing landowners, where the choice set of 
future land use may include enrollment in an easement, conversion, or the status quo. Even if a 
landowner chooses not to preserve, the existence of an option to do so may alter the time at 
which conversion occurs. Results from real options theory suggest that this may be the case – 
and, in particular, that the existence of the PDR option may delay conversion decisions.  
Policy Environment  
The study area for the empirical portion of this paper is Howard County, Maryland (see 
Figure 1). In this county, and indeed in most of the U.S., the primary mechanism for land use 
regulation is zoning which limits the number of units per acre via density requirements, open 
space requirements, and environmental restrictions. As a land preservation mechanism, zoning is 
not a very useful tool because these regulations are impermanent and, in most cases, cannot 
entirely prohibit land conversion.
2  Other than zoning and offering the preservation easement 
option, this county has relied on adequate public facilities ordinances (APFO) to manage the 
pace and pattern of development. These ordinances allow the county to postpone, temporarily, 
                                                 
2 Prohibitions on land conversion for environmental reasons are possible in some parts of Maryland – particularly 
along the Chesapeake Bay - but none of these areas exist in Howard County.   5
new subdivision construction in any planning zone with insufficient school capacity until new 
infrastructure can be built.  
Howard County is unique because its location, wealth, and rural history combine to 
create competing preferences for growth and open space preservation. The county’s proximity to 
Baltimore and Washington make it a prime target for development, and the county has 
experienced heavy development pressure in recent decades. For example, during the 1990’s, the 
population of the county increased from 187,000 to 247,842 (a 32% increase) and median home 
values rose from $166,500 to $244,700 - a 46% increase, and to $425,000 in 2006.
3 Zoning 
regulations in the rural sections of the county have added to development pressures. The 
county’s allowable housing density outside the public water and sewer service boundaries – that 
is, land nominally eligible for agricultural preservation – is one house per 3 to 4.25 acres, as 
compared to the considerably denser standard in neighboring counties of one house per 15 to 25 
acres. 
  In this regulatory environment the Howard County PDR program purchases development 
rights from landowners and thus offers a mutually agreeable means for achieving permanent land 
preservation. In general, PDR programs sever the development potential from the land while 
allowing the landowner to pursue any other permitted use of the land. As with many PDR 
programs, Howard County’s program purchases easements that are attached to the land in 
perpetuity, thus applying to all future land owners.  
The Howard County PDR program began in 1978 and over the life of the program 
funding has been a nagging issue. From the very start the county’s budget constraint was 
binding. Applicants whose parcels received a relatively low subjective ranking were either 
unable to preserve or experienced delays in the timing of preservation. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of preservation activity over time. Parcels were preserved during the 1980’s under a 
lump sum payment option which limited the amount of enrollment due to the significant one 
time payments from county coffers.  
                                                 
3 Data obtained from http://www.mdp.state.md.us/msdc/dw_ACS.htm and  
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-context=qt&-qr_name=DEC_1990_STF1_DP1&-
ds_name=DEC_1990_STF1_&-CONTEXT=qt&-tree_id=100&-all_geo_types=N&-geo_id=05000US24027&-
format=&-_lang=en accessed March 2007.   6
To address this issue as well as attempt to keep pace with increasing development values 
significant funds ($55 million) were appropriated in 1988 and again in 2000 ($15 million), 
leading to easement purchases in 1990-97 and 2002 to the present, respectively.  
These funds carried a unique and creative financing change designed to enroll more parcels 
while land was still “affordable”. First, the financing system was converted from a one-time 
payout to a tax free installment payout for 25-30 years and a balloon payment for the full 
easement amount at term end. From the landowners’ perspective this greatly eased the tax 
consequences of enrollment and enticed enrollment because the sum of all payments ends up 
being over twice the amount of the easement price. From the county’s perspective this allowed 
the financial outlay to be spread across many years enabling more enrollments in each year. The 
second major change concerned the funding source. As of 1988 the funding was tied to a 0.25% 
tax on real estate sales transactions.  In this way funding was secured via activity in the 
development market and future funding could be more reliably forecasted. The maximum 
payment per acre has changed in discrete steps since program inception, in 1988 the amount was 
$6,600 per acre, adjusted to $20,000 in 2001, and is currently at $40,000 an acre.
 4 
Preservation Program Details 
  To qualify for the county PDR program, a parcel must be at least 100 acres; parcels at 
least 25 acres qualify if adjacent to at least 50 acres of preserved farmland. Eligibility requires 
50% of land to be in the best soil classes and 66% in the top four of six land capability classes, as 
defined by the NRCS.
5  In addition, only parcels not served by public sewer and water are 
eligible. The price a landowner can expect to receive for an easement in the county PDR 
program is based on a published, publicly available, formula. For example, the county pays a 
higher price for parcels with better soils, more surrounding agricultural land, less erosion or 
drainage problems, and more actively farmed land in the production of food or fiber. The amount 
of public road frontage also adds value to a parcel in enrollment.  For a sample price formula 
worksheet see Appendix A.  
The county ranks the applications based on the same criteria as in the pricing formula 
together with subjective information on the parcel’s viability in farming and its contribution to 
                                                 
4 For comparison the estimated development value was $15,000 per acre in 1988 per the county documentation 
proposing the changes to the financing structure. 
5 These eligibility requirements remained constant during the study period, but were slightly modified in 2003.    7
the farming industry (for example, farms with feed mills, processing, or storage facilities are 
likely ranked higher).  Landowners are entitled to develop “family lots” while enrolled in the 
preservation program at a density of one lot per 50 acres enrolled. These family lots are meant to 
encourage farm transfers between generations, but there are no restrictions on the sale of these 
lots so landowners willing to forgo or limit this entitlement receive higher rankings. Parcels 
whose owners have offered to sell their easements are ranked on the basis of the above 
considerations and the county extends offers until funds are exhausted in each year. Deadlines 
for application are in November and decisions are made by the county in the following spring. 
To address environmental concerns each preserved farm must file a conservation plan with the 
county.  
Theoretical Framework 
To analyze the effects of a land preservation program on development decisions, a 
theoretical model of the timing of these decisions serves as a necessary starting point. Land 
conversion occurs when the land use is changed from an undeveloped or agricultural state to a 
developed state. The traditional  economic model used to evaluate land conversion decisions 
implies a landowner will switch land use when the discounted stream of returns to development 
exceeds the discounted returns to the status quo land use — either agriculture, forestry, or a 
natural vegetative state. This is a net present value (NPV) approach (Carrion-Flores and Irwin, 
2004; Parks, 1995; Brownstone and De Vany, 1991; Stavins and Jaffe, 1990).  
Each period in which the land remains in the status quo state the landowner is viewed as 
making a decision about his land. The decision to subdivide is the first step in an irreversible 
development process and thus is the important decision to model for land use conversion. 
Subdivision is expensive to the landowner because it requires a change in tax status as well as 
legal, regulatory, and drafting fees. An alternative end state for undeveloped land in the study 
area is enrollment in the county agricultural easement program. In what follows any reference to 
‘preservation’ refers to enrolling in an easement program in perpetuity
6 and to ‘conversion’ or 
‘development’ refers to subdividing a parcel into housing lots unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
The small amount of land that is zoned ‘commercial/industrial’ is ignored, as commercial 
development is not an option in areas where preservation is possible. 
                                                 
6 Throughout, the term ‘parcel’ is used to refer to the original undeveloped land unit and ‘lot’ to each of the 
subdivided land units.   8
Putting the preservation option aside for the moment, the traditional conversion decision 
rule is the net present value rule which suggests a landowner will change land use at the moment 
the return to conversion is greater than the discounted sum of future agricultural returns.
7  The 
net present value rule (NPV) prescribes conversion when 









s  is the discount rate and A(i, t+s) is the return to agriculture for parcel i in period t+s, so that 
the right hand side of (1) is the discounted net present value of all future agricultural returns. 
C(i,t) is the conversion cost which may include real estate fees and infrastructure costs, and D(i,t) 
is the return to the landowner from subdividing.  
In many exurban areas, development returns net of conversion costs can be expected to 
exceed the discounted stream of agricultural returns for most parcels, yet we do not observe all 
parcels immediately converting to development. In such areas, the NPV conversion rule implies 
more land conversion than is actually observed. A modification to this conversion rule, first 
suggested by Titman (1990), allows the possibility of no conversion, even when conversion 
returns exceed agricultural returns, as long as the net returns to development today fail to exceed 
the expected net returns of development in the next period. Development will occur under this 
rule if: 
(2)  D(i,t) -  C(i,t) > At(i,t)+ { E[D(i,t+1)]-C(i,t+1)}, 
where E[] is the expectation operator. This framework implies that all parcels will eventually be 
profitable for development and follows from the expectation of no real growth in agricultural 
returns in the region or growth that is slow relative to growth in development returns as to be 
trivial. The expression in (2) mimics a stochastic dynamic programming approach and has 
formed the basis of previous research on development (e.g. Irwin, 1998), where postponement 
(or the ‘wait’ decision) was attributed to expected increases in development returns.  
The alternative end state – preservation – can be introduced into this framework. This is 
represented as the present value of an infinite stream of agricultural returns plus the easement 
                                                 
7 The analysis will ignore the fact that land not in agricultural use or developed use (simply “undeveloped” land) has 
a negative return stream based on the NPV approach in an accounting sense, although it may generate utility to its 
owner. Since forest use is an agricultural use, the “undeveloped” category is a small percentage of land in the 
exurban area.   9
payout. Defining y as the present value of expected returns from the landowner’s optimal 
decision, the decision rule is now based on the maximum value function:   








(, )+ e(i), E[D(i,t)] – C (i,t), A(i,t)+( E[D(i,t+1)]-C(i,t+1)}.  
The first term on the right hand side of equation 3 is the monetary return to preservation, 
equaling the returns to agriculture in perpetuity plus the easement payment, e(i), which varies 
over parcels.
8 The second term is the expected net development return if development is initiated 
in the current period. The third term represents the returns from agriculture in the current period 
plus the discounted expected net returns from postponing development until the next period.
  
A Real Options Model of Land Conversion 
A key element of the models in expressions 2 and 3 is the term representing the value of 
waiting. The value of waiting to make an investment is analogous to a financial option in which 
having the option to make a decision in the future is of value. Many economists have compared 
the development decision to the exercise of an option (see Capozza and Li, 1994; Capozza and 
Hensley, 1990; Geltner et al., 1996; Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins, 2002). Real options are 
like financial options but pertain to real assets such as land.  
Unlike a NPV conversion rule, a real options approach allows uncertainty to influence 
decisions. Specifically, the option to invest in the future has value which helps explain why 
undeveloped parcels exist even when development returns exceed returns from the current use. 
Three characteristics define a real option: the option once exercised is irreversible, the decision 
can be delayed, and uncertainty exists about future payoffs. The land conversion decision 
exhibits all these features. First, developed land is generally not converted back to agricultural 
land. Second, the decision can be delayed and, in most cases, cannot be removed from the parcel 
owner by right, eminent domain cases being the exception. Finally, the payoffs are uncertain 
because future property values are uncertain.  
In most real options models of land use and in the model being proposed here, the 
uncertainty associated with decisions is concentrated in the returns to future development. The 
landowner is assumed to have far less uncertainty over returns to current uses (which may be 
                                                 
8 The easement offer can be a standing offer or a “once and done” offer.  The calculations are essentially the same.  
The spread may be different between current development price and easement offer price. (Fackler, Brimlow, and 
Mercer; 2007).   10
effectively zero or may experience little variation over time) and to easement payments (as they 
follow published county formula). However future returns to development – and especially 
growth in those returns – may be highly variable over time, depending on regional growth in 
population, employment, and incomes, as well as changes in interest rates, construction costs, 
and in the demographic composition of the population. In relative terms the primary uncertainty 
parameter in this model is the uncertainty in development returns.  
The basic real options story is outlined in many sources (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, 
Ch. 5), so the focus of this discussion is on the key elements relevant to the empirical model to 
be described in the next section. The problem is one of choosing the optimal time to invest in a 
project with return of D and an investment cost of C. D is assumed to evolve over time following 
a geometric Brownian motion with drift: 
( 4 )        Ddz Ddt dD      . 
In equation 4, α is the ‘drift’ (i.e. the rate of growth) in expected returns, σ is the standard error 
of the change in investment value, and dz is an increment of a Weiner process or the continuous 
time equivalent of a random walk. Equation 4 implies that the current value of the project is 
known, but future values are uncertain.
9  The change in development value is assumed 
distributed log normal with a variance that grows linearly with the time horizon.
10   
In this study D represents the gross return to the landowner from subdividing the parcel 
and selling the resulting lots to households. D is a function of parcel, neighborhood, and regional 
characteristics that are likely to influence development returns. The value of the option to 
convert land in the future is defined by the function F(D): 
(5)      ] )
~
) , ( [( max ) (
t
t
e C t i D E D F
    , 
where T is the optimal time of conversion, C ~
 is the cost of conversion including opportunity 
costs of foregoing future agricultural returns, and ρ is the discount rate.
11 C ~
 is assumed to vary 
little in real terms over the foreseeable time horizon. The option will be exercised when the 
return to investment exceeds the expected capital appreciation in the value of the option.  
                                                 
9 In the land conversion model, the drift and variance parameters are time varying. This does not change the 
interpretation. 
10 Employing techniques described in Marathe and Ryan (2005) the assumption of log normality is validated. This is 
done by testing whether the change in inflation adjusted house prices departs from a log normal distribution. 
Specifically, the difference in the log mean sales prices from year t and t-1, by tract, does not violate the null 
hypothesis of normality using a Shapiro-Wilk test or visually using Q-Q plots. 
11 It is necessary for ρ > α. That is, the impatience embodied in the discount rate must exceed the mean increase in 
return. Otherwise, a landowner would always find it optimal to wait to invest.   11
The solution to the problem must satisfy several conditions, including continuity 
restrictions and an ‘absorbing boundary’ condition - if the option value goes to zero it stays at 
zero. In the land use context, a zero option value would imply that the development option is no 
longer available, which is typically not possible unless the landowner enters a preservation 
easement. Dixit and Pindyck derive the solution to the optimal timing decision as: 








where the term pre-multiplying C ~
represents the wedge between the real options investment rule 
and the neoclassical (NPV) investment rule. The term  is a function of the drift ( ), standard 
error ( ), and a discount rate ( ) and is shown by Dixit and Pindyck to be positive and greater 
than 1. Therefore, in a world of growing development returns, the real options rule represents 
delayed development relative to the NPV rule. 
Dixit and Pindyck derive the comparative static results that are the basis for inclusion of 
the variance and drift variables in this empirical application. They show that   is decreasing in 
both drift ( ) and standard error ( ). Since  0 ) 1 ( )
~
(
2       
   A C D , a decrease in   
implies a larger wedge between investment return and cost. This increases the hurdle to 
development and delays the optimal time to convert. The comparative static results from the 
options framework imply that increases in the variance and drift of the returns to development 
decrease   and thus will tend to delay conversion decisions. The next section describes the 
necessary empirical framework for testing the theoretical predictions from real options theory. 
The Empirical Framework 
The initial hypothesis concerns whether or not preservation eligibility affects the timing 
of the development decision. In the event that a statistically significant effect is found, it is also 
of interest to quantify the magnitude of the impact. The last section framed the decision process 
for the landowner in the context of an options model where the landowner had three choices at 
any given time - convert, preserve, or wait. This section presents an empirical model capable of 
estimating the preservation eligibility impact on the conversion decision as well as the impact of 
price volatility in the time dimension. Although the easement price does not fluctuate explicitly 
with market conditions, qualification for the easement program does present an additional option   12
which is expected to enter the decision process of the landowner when making land use 
decisions. 
Many land use studies evaluate conversion decisions utilizing discrete choice models as a 
function of parcel level attributes (Bockstael, 1996; McMillen, 1989; Kline and Alig, 1999; 
Landis and Zhang, 1998). This approach provides insights on how parcel attributes affect the 
probability of conversion but does not account for the dynamic environment in which conversion 
decisions are made. Duration models, on the other hand, are particularly useful for studying 
factors affecting the occurrence and timing of decisions and are increasingly applied in a land 
use context (Mayer and Somerville, 2000; Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; Bulan, Mayer, and 
Somerville, 2002; Hite, et al., 2003).  
Duration models are employed because the addition of a time dimension allows for more 
sophisticated preservation program evaluation – something more than counting acres preserved. 
Also, duration models can incorporate time varying covariates which help account for the 
dynamic environment in which land use decisions are made. Duration models explicitly take 
account of the fact that an action taken in period t implies the action was not taken in any 
previous period, T<t. This model will be used to test the impacts of the preservation option on 
the timing of conversion and to test the comparative static results from real options theory. In 
order to be more confident in the results, several obstacles must be overcome - most importantly 
the impact of unobserved heterogeneity and the assumption of non-random censoring.  
Duration Analysis   
An exhaustive review of the concepts of duration models can be found elsewhere.
12   
What follows is a very brief summary of the basics and terminology required to present the 
proposed empirical model. Suppose one is concerned with a random variable t, the time until an 
event, and one wishes to know the influence of specific covariates x on t. An application of least 
squares to this type of problem suffers from three major problems – it requires data aggregation 
that will drop time varying covariates, it cannot handle censored observations (observations that 
do not experience the ‘event’), and it might predict meaningless negative durations (event 
occurrence before time zero).  
                                                 
12 For detailed surveys see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980); Keifer (1988); Lancaster(1990)   13
Duration models were developed to address these limitations. Observations (spells) are 
realizations of an underlying random process which can be characterized by the probability 
density function (pdf) 
) Pr( ) ( dt t T t t f       
and the corresponding cumulative density, 
) Pr( ) ( ) (
0 t T ds s f t F
t
   ,  0  t , 
where  0  T denotes the duration until failure and t denotes a particular value of T. By assuming 
f(t) has only nonnegative support eliminates the possibility of negative time durations.  
The survival function, S(t)=1-F(t), is the complement of the cumulative distribution 
function (cdf) and is the mathematical representation of the likelihood of surviving until time t. 
Thus S(t)= ) Pr( t T  . The survival function serves as the contribution to the likelihood function 
for observations that do not fail during the time under study. These observations are called ‘right-
censored’ in the literature. Observations that “fail” contribute the value of their pdf to the 
likelihood function.  
One additional function of interest is the hazard function, ) (t  . The hazard function is the 
instantaneous probability of failure in the interval dt assuming survival up to time t:  
(7)    
) (
) (
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t S
t f
t T dt t T t t        . 
The discrete analog to (7) is 
(8)    
t
t T t t T t
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0  . 
To facilitate estimation, it is necessary to incorporate covariates. This is typically 
accomplished by specifying the individual hazard as 
(9)      ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 X t t i     , 
where  ) (x  is the systematic part typically specified as exp[Xi ] and  ) ( 0 t  is the baseline 
hazard common to all observations. This general form is called the proportional hazards 
specification because the effect of covariates is to shift the hazard proportionally. It is, by far, the 
most popular model utilized in the hazard literature. Since duration models do not aggregate data 
across time, incorporating time varying covariates in this framework is straightforward.    14
The most common approach to estimation is maximum likelihood. Observations are 
divided into two groups: observed failures and censored observations. As observed failures enter 
the hazard via their probability density functions and censored observations enter through their 
survival functions, the general form of the log likelihood function for N observations is written as 





i i i i i i X t S d X t f d L
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)] , ( ln[ ) 1 ( )] , ( ln[ ln . 
Xi is observation i’s vector of observed covariates and di is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
i
th observation fails during the study period and 0 if the observation is right-censored. From this 
formula, it is easy to see how hazard models utilize information from censored observations via 
the likelihood contribution of the survival function.
13     
There are important explicit assumptions involved in estimating a traditional parametric 
hazard model, most noticeably the choice of baseline hazard specification. This specification has 
implications in the f(•) and S(•) functions of the likelihood function. If strong prior theoretical or 
empirical grounds exist to imply a particular form for the baseline hazard, a parametric function 
for ) ( 0 t  can be imposed at the outset, but imposing a particular baseline hazard specification 
restricts the shape of the baseline hazard and may impose a specific and incorrect form of 
duration dependence. Models that incorporate semi-parametric and a non-parametric baseline 
hazards will be estimated in this analysis to validate parametric baseline hazard assumptions. At 
this point there are two other problems that deserve greater attention—unobserved heterogeneity 
and non-random censoring. 
Incorporating Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Despite the great detail afforded by the land use data available in this study area, there are 
still significant unobservable individual or parcel specific factors that will impact the conversion 
or preservation decision. To make the model robust in the presence of influential unobservables, 
an estimation approach that can accommodate a distribution of unobservable “random effects” 
will be utilized. In the land use context unobservables arise from at least two sources related to 
the parcel, through parcel attributes and landowner attributes. 
                                                 
13 This formula ignores the possibility of time varying covariates (TVC). Including them amounts to adding ‘spells’ 
to the data, where a ‘spell’ is defined as an interval of time and the associated quantities relevant to each observation 
during that interval. That is, an observation will contribute multiple spells of data, one for each time interval over 
which covariates remain constant. With TVC one should estimate standard errors using appropriate robust 
techniques that drop the independence assumption between observations.   15
Unobservable parcel attributes include but are not limited to the type of activity on the 
parcel. In the dataset it is known that a parcel is in an agricultural use but there is no knowledge 
of the type of agricultural activity.
14  It would be logical that certain farm types are more likely to 
enroll in a preservation program while simultaneously less likely to convert. Other unobservable 
attributes include aesthetic characteristics such as favorable elevations that may increase a 
parcel’s value in housing or odd shaped parcels which may hinder the likelihood of both 
development and preservation.  
Unobservable landowner attributes will also affect the hazards of development and 
preservation. Landowners with intensive investment in the operation may be less inclined to 
convert because of unrecoverable investment costs, but these same parcels might be more 
inclined to protect their investment by enrolling in an easement program. Landowners close to 
retirement age may tend to develop while those in need of cash to pay off farm debt or finance a 
child’s college education may be more likely to develop or preserve relative to the status quo. 
All of these individual landowner attributes potentially impact the duration variables of interest 
but are not available in most land use datasets. 
In general, unobserved heterogeneity arises because of the inability of a researcher to 
obtain all the relevant covariates that govern the duration under study. Concerning duration 
dependence, the most serious problem is this: unobserved heterogeneity tends to produce 
estimated hazard functions that decline in time, even when the true hazard is not declining for 
any individual in the sample (Allison, 1997).  
This paper will incorporate unobserved heterogeneity following the approach outlined by 
Lancaster (1990) and Kalbfeisch and Prentice (1980). In this case a parametric distribution is 
multiplicatively included in the proportional hazards specification: 
(11)      i i i X t t     ) exp( ) ( ) ( 0  . 
In duration models i  is often called “frailty”, although  i   is more familiarly recognized as a 
random effect (see Nickell (1979), Flinn and Heckman (1982) for implementations). Models that 
specify a parametric baseline and a parametric frailty are called mixture models because the 
“error” is essentially a mixture of two distributions. The “frailty” term is drawn from a 
distribution with density  ) ( g  and is assumed uncorrelated with any covariates in the model. 
The imposition of a random effect is a contentious and perhaps heroic assumption, because of 
                                                 
14 Publicly available data do not contain parcel level crop or livestock activity.    16
this assumption of zero correlation between the random effect and the observed covariates. In 
panel data models the uncorrelated nature of the random effect is testable, but in single spell 
duration data it is not (Heckman and Singer, 1982).
15   
In its simplest form incorporating unobserved heterogeneity requires an additional 
distributional assumption. It also requires the estimation of an additional parameter for the 
variance of the frailty distribution which allows testing the hypothesis that there is no undue 
influence of unobserved heterogeneity.  
Non-random censoring / multi-state models 
To this point the discussion has focused on univariate hazard models, i.e. models with 
one exit state of interest. If alternative exit states exist in the context of a univariate hazard 
analysis, their  independence with the exit state of interest (conditional on observed covariates) is 
a necessary implicit assumption.
16 This assumption is referred to as random censoring or non-
informative censoring. An obvious extension to the univariate model, and a necessary one for the 
analysis in this paper, allows for multiple exit states of interest. In the land use context some 
parcels can ‘exit’ the status quo state by enrolling in the preservation program or by converting 
to development, and both possibilities should be explicitly accounted for in estimation.  What’s 
more, there is no reason to assume that exit to preservation is independent of the development 
decision, even when conditioned on observables. For example, landowners whose circumstances 
require them to liquidate assets are more likely either to develop or preserve than to remain in the 
status quo state. 
In competing risks models, exits are mutually exclusive. This analysis is a competing 
risks model because parcels exiting to preservation are precluded from converting and those 
exiting to conversion cannot subsequently enroll in the preservation program.
17  The remaining 
discussion is presented assuming these two mutually exclusive states. 
With mutually exclusive exit states, the entire distribution of survival times, S(t1, t2), is 
not observable. As a consequence competing risk models are considered latent variable models. 
                                                 
15 However, with the addition of time varying covariates which effectively induces a panel dataset, a Hausman test 
might be applicable, though not currently established. 
16 This is the hazard model’s version of the conditional independence assumption. If a researcher can identify and 
measure the underlying risk factors that produce the dependency, then accounting for them explicitly in the model 
maybe sufficient to ensure this condition.  
17 Although both reversals are technically possible it is unlikely a housing development will revert to agriculture and 
preserve.  As designed preservation easements are written in perpetuity and thus not legally reversible except in 
extreme circumstances.   17
The researcher observes T = min(T1, T2) along with the cause of failure outcome, O. The data (T, 
O) are referred to as the identified minimum. In the absence of regressors the joint distribution 
(T1, T2) is not identified by (T, O) (Cox, 1959, 1962; Tsiatis, 1975). In particular, for any joint 
distribution of dependent failure times there is a joint distribution of independent failure times 
that will produce the same identified minimum.
18  Because it was believed that all dependent 
competing risks models were unidentified, it was common practice to assume independence for 
estimation (Gordon, 2002). However, erroneously assuming independence leads to incorrect 
inference. In addition, the fact that durations, Tk (k=1, 2), are related is often an important issue 
in its own right. In general, independence of alternative end states is likely not to hold if 
individual behavior influences the decision to enter multiple end states.  
Identification of these models, with regressors, was first established by Heckman and 
Honore (1989) and again by Abbring and van den Berg (2003) for the class of models defined as 
mixed proportional hazard (MPH) models with the unobservables correlated across risks. The 
latter approach is used in this analysis. By focusing on MPH models Abbring and van den Berg 
impose fewer restrictions on the domain of the covariates, X. Loosely speaking, X must have two 
continuous variables that are not perfectly collinear and that act differently on each hazard in the 
two-risk world (van den Berg, 2005).  
A Land Use Application of the Dependent Competing Risks Model  
Utilizing data on the timing of preservation, Tp, and the timing of conversion, Tc, 
combined with parcel attributes, X, the proposed hypotheses  that preservation eligibility 
influences development decisions will be tested and the size of any effect estimated. This work 
closely follows Lillard (1993), Fallick and Ryu (2007), McCall (1996), Steele and Curtis (2003), 
Deng, et al. (2000) and Abbring with van den Berg (2003). However it is the first such 
implementation in a land use context.  
The hazard for the preservation rate is given by 
  (12)        p p
p
p
p v z X X I t v z X t   exp ) ( ) ( ) , , | ( 0         
where I(X) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the parcel is known to be eligible for the 
preservation program as defined by eligibility criteria and characteristics of the parcel,  ) ( 0 t
p  is 
the baseline hazard of preservation, and  ) , , | ( p
p v z X t  is the instantaneous hazard rate. 
                                                 
18 This non-identifiability theorem was established for models in the absence of covariates.   18
Covariates in X include parcel attributes and locational attributes of surrounding land use. The 
covariate z is a dummy variable equal to one in the years the program was funded and zero 
otherwise. Finally the parameter  p v  represents unobserved heterogeneity in the preservation 
hazard process.  
The conversion hazard is 
(13)     c c
c
c
c v Y X t v Y X t ) exp( ) ( ) , , | ( 0        , 
where X  includes all variables in common with the preservation hazard, Y includes variables 
expected to influence the conversion hazard through conversion costs or development pressures  
(including the options variables described in the theoretical model), and  c v  is the unobserved 
heterogeneity parameter specific to the conversion hazard. Variables included in X and Y can, 
and do, change across time. However the unobservable parameters,  p v  and  c v  , are observation-
specific and not time-specific. As has been true throughout, time subscripts are omitted to reduce 
notational complexity, but X, Y, and z all contain time varying covariates. 
In the competing risks framework these hazard rates will be jointly estimated. The system 
of equations in log form is rewritten as 
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where the baseline hazards  ) ( 0 t
c  and  ) ( 0 t
p   are replaced by functions of time,  ) ( 0 t Hc  and 
) ( 0 t H p  . Selection of distributional assumptions will be described in the next section. To 
estimate the dependent competing risks model the parameters  p v  and  c v  are allowed to be 
correlated and the correlation parameter,
p cv v  , is estimated jointly in the model.  
    To compose the likelihood function there are three cases to consider—the parcel 
converts, the parcel preserves, or the parcel does not change status.  
i.) The contribution to the likelihood function for parcels that convert, where t is the conversion 
period, is given by the following
19: 
 , ) , , , , | 1 , 1 Pr( ) 1 , 1 Pr( , p c p c v v p c v v z Y X t T t T t E t T t T t
p c             
                                                 
19 Technically the probability  ) 1 , 1 Pr(      t T t T t p c  is an approximation of the true probability, 
) , 1 Pr( c p c T T t T t     . This approximation is used because the true probability, which is the probability of 
receiving a preservation and a conversion offer in the same year, is quite involved to compute and would be a rare 
occurrence.    19
ii.) the contribution for parcels that preserve (where t is the period in which the preservation 
takes place) is: 
)], , , , , | 1 , 1 [Pr( ) 1 , 1 Pr( , p c c p v v c p v v z Y X t T t T t E t T t T t
p c             
iii.) and the contribution for parcels that remain in the current state for the duration of the study 
period is: 
)] , , , , | , [Pr( ) , Pr( , p c c p v v c p v v z Y X t T t T E t T t T
p c      , 
where E is the expectation operator.  
The integrated hazard rates for preservation and conversion are defined as 
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The survivor function is equal to the exponentiated negative integrated hazard, so that the 
survivor functions are  
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Now if conditional independence of the exit states is assumed, based on the observed data and 
inclusion of unobservables in the model, the probabilities i. through iii. can be rewritten as 
    i΄)  
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20 Due to the discrete nature of the data this assumption must be made.   20
Since the realization of (vc, vp) is not observed the expectation of these quantities must be 
taken with respect to the stochastic nature of (vc, vp). In the hazard literature this is accomplished 
by making a parametric assumption or using a bivariate discrete distribution following Heckman 
and Singer. For this presentation, a bivariate normal distribution is assumed to estimate the 
competing risks model.
21 














































p c p c p c v v v v v v      . 
This assumption requires the data to be modeled as continuous data which is often done in 
hazard models if the distribution of failures within the discrete step is not important to the 
analysis. In this paper information on the month of conversion will be used and continuity 
assumed, so this assumption is not overly restrictive.  
Embedded in this model is the assumption that, conditional on the unobserved 
heterogeneity, the marginal density functions for the failure times are independent. Defining the 
term  ) (t  as representing the covariate paths of z, Y, and X from the beginning of the study 
period, the distribution of failure times for parcel i is given by 
) ), ( ), ( , ( ) ), ( , ( ) ), ( , ( p
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for a parcel that preserves, and 
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for a parcel that converts. Again, assuming conditional independence, censored parcels (those 
remaining in the risk set at the end of the study period) are represented by their survival 
functions 
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21 Distributional assumptions will be described and validated, where possible, in the estimation section of this paper.   21
where  1  pn   if the parcel preserves and  1  cn  if the parcel converts. The term  ) , ( c p v v f  is the 
pdf of the bivariate frailty distribution. This parameterization of the frailty distribution requires 
numerical integration to compute the likelihood function. This framework allows the impact of 
covariates to be measured in the time dimension and in the presence of the preservation program 
where the preservation exit is modeled explicitly and can influence the outcome of the 
conversion hazard. That is, the decision to exit the risk set by preserving the parcel is not 
assumed to be simply a case of random censoring. Estimation for these complex models is 
accomplished using aML, statistical software specifically designed to estimate correlated 
outcomes and joint models (Lillard and Panis, 2003). 
This competing risks model addresses both unobserved heterogeneity and non-random 
censoring and can be very general. However a parametric assumption is still required for the 
baseline hazard and the heterogeneity parameters to facilitate estimation.  
Data  
The data for this study include all parcels that, as of the end of 1990, were eligible to be 
subdivided into at least three new housing lots. The process by which these parcels were 
identified was quite complex and included two components. The first component involved 
identifying all actual subdivision activity during the study period and the second required 
classifying parcels that had not been developed during the study period as either potentially 
‘developable’ or not.  
The first component utilized the tax assessment data base for Howard County for clues 
that would link disappearing parcels with newly appearing housing lots. A variable called a 
‘record creation date’ helped establish the date (month and year) at which an identified parcel 
subdivision took place. Because the record creation date variable was not included in the data 
base prior to 1991, the study period must begin at that point.
22 This record creation is also used 
as the date of failure for the conversion hazard.
23 After cross-checking and correcting using a 
2003 map of property boundaries, the final product of this first component emerged as a map of 
                                                 
22 Prior subdivisions are identifiable, but their conversion dates are not known with precision. 
23 A second source of subdivision data came directly from the Howard County planners office which included the 
actual county database used to track large subdivisions from application to approval. Though this list was not 
geocoded or well-organized, some account identifiers facilitated cross-checking of previous subdivision 
assignments.`   22
subdivision activity that took place between 1991 and 2001, including the boundaries of the final 
housing lots and the reconstructed boundaries of the original pre-subdivision parcels. 
Once the actually developed parcels had been identified, all potentially developable 
parcels were defined using attribute data for the parcel and existing zoning regulations. 
Undeveloped parcels eligible for inclusion in the observation set were those zoned in a way that 
allowed for residential development and those with capacity for at least three additional housing 
units, given maximum density regulations applicable to the parcel. Parcels with existing houses 
were included as long as they met this criterion. Zoning regulations were obtained from Howard 
County’s 1992 zoning ordinance. The zoning categories relevant to each parcel were determined 
from the tax assessment data base and, where missing, from the digitized zoning map available 
from the Maryland Department of Planning.
24 
Ineligible lands were removed from this initial set. Included in these deletions was land 
preserved through preservation or conservation activity prior to 1991, as well as wildlife 
sanctuaries, parks and other prior public acquisitions. Parcels were also deleted from the 
observation set if their observed shape precluded reasonable subdivision. The resulting dataset 
represents the county landscape as of 1990 and the conversion history from 1991 to 2001. The 
conversion (failure) time is defined as the date the lots of a subdivision were recorded.
25  
While all parcels eligible for preservation must also be developable, not all potentially 
developable parcels had the option to preserve, only those meeting quite specific eligibility 
criteria. Because the 100 minimum acre limit was relaxed for parcels adjacent to already 
preserved or protected land, smaller parcels that became eligible as adjoining parcels were 
preserved were added to the eligibility pool during the study period where appropriate. The 
preservation (failure) time is defined as the year of preservation according to the assignment of 
the easement. 
The final data set includes 1,756 parcels totaling 43,300 acres. The distribution of these 
parcels is displayed in figure 3. Of these parcels 258 were eligible for preservation at some time 
during the study period and 59 enrolled in the preservation program. Each of these sets of parcels 
is shown in figure 4. The distribution of the 463 subdivided parcels is shown in figure 5. Of the 
                                                 
24 Current data are available from http://www.mdp.state.md.us/. 
25 In the case where a parcel converted but left a portion of land large enough to be further subdivided this portion is 
redefined as a new parcel and returned to the risk set.   23
subdivided parcels in the final data set, 57 were eligible to preserve which illustrates the 
competing nature of preservation and conversion in the county.  
  Equations 1 through 6 contain the theory that informs the empirical model. Consistent 
with the NPV investment rule, factors that increase returns net of opportunity costs (D) or 
decrease investment costs (C) will make a parcel more profitable for development. But unlike the 
NPV rule, real options theory suggests that an option value exists that drives a wedge between D 
and C. This ‘risk premium’ is expected to be a function of the drift and variance in net returns 
and the number of alternative options available to the decision maker. 
In the context of housing development, D represents a one-time net return, or the price of 
the parcel sold for the purpose of development, minus the present value of the foregone stream of 
earnings from the undeveloped use. Defined in this way D will be a function of parcel and 
neighborhood characteristics that are likely to influence the value of the housing lots to 
consumers, regional factors associated with demand pressures for new housing, as well as 
physical features and market forces affecting agricultural returns.  
Among the most commonly considered factors in D are commuting costs to major 
employment centers – in this case, Baltimore, MD (distBA) and Washington, D.C. (distDC). 
Recent empirical evidence indicates that surrounding land uses also affect the value of land in 
developed uses (e.g., Irwin, 2002; Irwin and Bockstael, 2001). Surrounding land uses are 
aggregated into ten categories: developable land with an existing house (e.g. a farmstead) 
(sluDevWithHs), developable land without an existing house (sluDevNoHs), 
commercial/industrial/institutional use (sluComm), subdivided land (but not yet built on) 
(sluSubdiv), preserved land (sluPreserved), private not developable openspace (sluOpen), roads 
(sluRoad), protected land (e.g. publicly supplied open space) (sluProtected), and “fully 
developed” land in residential use (the normalized category). The surrounding land use measures 
are calculated as percentages of land within a 100 meter buffer around the true boundary of each 
parcel.
26 The surrounding land use measures are updated in each analysis year as neighboring 
parcels are converted, preserved, or built upon.  
In order to proxy for important attributes at a scale larger than the immediate 
neighborhood two census related variables are included in the model. First, by overlaying the 
recent sales data from the Howard County tax assessment database on the census block group 
                                                 
26 Although surrounding land use results are sensitive to the use of larger radii, e.g. 400 and 800 meters, estimated 
coefficients associated with the main variables of interest in the models turn out not to be sensitive to the buffer size.   24
map, a spatially distinct variable for recent construction activity (devRate) is constructed. This 
variable is calculated as the percentage increase in housing stock by census block group from the 
previous year and is included to capture the influence of recent construction activity.
27  The 
recent construction activity serves at least two purposes – a) it picks up some desirability not 
fully measured by the distance or surrounding land use attributes and b) it proxies for areas of the 
county into which the planners’ office may be attempting to funnel new development. A second 
variable measuring the density of housing (popDen), calculated as number of housing units per 
acre at the tract level, is also included as a proxy for congestion.  
Zoning regulations affect returns by specifying the maximum number of lots that can be 
subdivided (numLots) and any open space set-aside requirements (reqOpenSpace) that might 
pertain to the parcel. These regulations are treated as exogenous, given that the Howard County 
Comprehensive Plan and zoning codes were passed in 1990 and remained unchanged through the 
study period. A final regulatory variable (Apfo) equals zero or one, respectively, for any year in 
which the parcel is in a planning area constrained by an adequate public facilities moratorium 
relating to school capacity for none or any part of the year. This variable is updated as adequate 
public facilities moratoria are introduced and phased out.
28  
To capture opportunity costs and more specifically the effect of returns in an agricultural 
use, soil measures reflecting the quality of the soil for agricultural purposes (class1 through 
class4) are included. The effect of these variables is measured relative to the worst soils for 
agriculture (the excluded soil category). Although the soil classifications could proxy for 
agricultural returns, good agricultural soils can also be favorable for development, making the 
expected effect on the hazard rate ambiguous. Other measures relating to agricultural use are the 
percentage of the parcel in an agricultural use (agriculture) as well as a quadratic in parcel size 
(acres and acres
2).  The likely effect size has on the hazard rate is also ambiguous, as economies 
of scale may be evident in both farming and development. Additional variables included to proxy 
for opportunity costs include the binary variable (hasHouse) if the parcel has an existing 
structure and a binary variable indicating the parcel is included in the ten year planned sewer 
expansion boundary. Lower development hazard rates are expected for parcels with an existing 
house as the opportunity cost of development may now include amenity values such as recreation 
                                                 
27 This is calculated as new construction in year t divided by existing units as of the beginning of year t.  
28 The APFO data are compiled using legislative records and a subdivision tracking database from the Howard 
County Planning Department.   25
or privacy if the owner resides on the parcel. Similarly conversion rates are expected to be lower 
if the parcel is not yet served by public sewer but located within the planned sewer expansion 
boundary.  
In the model of land conversion, C represents the cost of developing the subdivision. To 
proxy for construction costs measures of extreme parcel slopes (steep), forest cover (forest), road 
suitability (notRoadSuit), and septic suitability (notSepticSuit) are measured as the percentage of 
land on each parcel in each classification.
29  Lower development hazard rates are expected for 
parcels with a higher percentage of land in any of these variables. Finally, the annualized 3 
month treasury note rate (intRate), which varies only over time and not parcels, is included as an 
indicator of the cost of carrying the land from the time the development process is initiated until 
the lots are sold. 
Variables that impact preservation eligibility are included in the preservation hazard. 
Recall these requirements are defined by the county exogenously based on soil quality, acreage, 
viability as a farm operation, and contribution to the farm sector. Thus variables such as acreage 
(acres), agricultural or forest use (agriculture or forested), terrain of the parcel (steep), and soil 
classes (class1-4) are included in the hazard model for preservation. Surrounding land uses are 
expected to be prevalent in the preservation hazard, as well as in the conversion hazard 
especially since many of the preservation requirements are enhanced or depend upon the 
neighboring land uses. Landowners might self-select for preservation due to development or 
preservation activity on surrounding parcels, and additionally, the county might choose to enroll 
a parcel which applies for the preservation program based on the activity surrounding the 
applying parcel, i.e. development pressures or agricultural uses. Thus surrounding land use 
measures are included in the preservation hazard.  
The dummy variable for the presence of an existing house is included (hasHouse) as is a 
dummy variable equal to one in years the county has funding (funded) for the preservation 
program.  The latter is the z variable described in equation 12. As mentioned earlier, forecasted 
funds were exhausted in 1993 and again in 1997-99. Even in the years of limited funding the 
program remained active and was never considered for cancellation.  
The options-related covariates, defined in detail in the next paragraphs, are included only 
in the development hazard and not in the preservation hazard. The compensation formula for the 
                                                 
29 These data are constructed from a variety of sources including the Maryland Department of Planning, NRCS 
natural soils maps, and SSURGO data. Slopes greater than 15% are considered extreme.   26
existence of a preservation option does not change during the time period and thus presents no 
variability to impact the preservation time. The full variable list is given in table 1 for both the X 
and Y matrices which pertain to both the development and preservation hazards defined in 
equation 14. Summary statistics for all the explanatory variables used in this analysis are 
presented in table 2 and a detailed listing of sources is presented in Appendix B.  
Options Variables 
The principle empirical task of this paper is to test whether the presence of the easement 
option delays development. The variable (Easement) equals one in the years a parcel is eligible 
to sell a preservation easement and in which a county preservation program budget exists to 
purchase easements. This variable is updated for parcels that became eligible during the study 
period due to prior preservation of adjacent parcels.  
The drift and variance variables described in the theoretical section are intended to 
capture the effects of uncertainty on development timing decisions. Landowners/developers are 
assumed to form expectations on returns from development based on recent home sales in the 
same geographic and socioeconomic vicinity. Therefore, the drift and variance variables are 
constructed using a separate dataset of sales of new and existing houses – all of which were built 
within the last 10 years. Sales in which price exceeded two standard deviations from the Census 
tract average for the year were omitted in order to eliminate the undue influence of outliers 
whose special characteristics were not observed or measured. After eliminating these outliers, as 
well as non-arms length sales and clearly mistyped entries, 37,085 observations remained.  
The drift variable for any given tract and year was calculated as the average rate of 
growth in deflated lot price for sales within the tract over the 3 previous years
30, corrected for 
some principle sources of price variation. For example, a landowner/developer forming 
expectations on the drift and variance in returns in order to make an investment decision in 1996 
is assumed to use information on housing sales within the relevant census tract from the years 
1993, 1994, and 1995. The covariates included to account for systematic price variation are the 
natural logs of each of the following - distance to Washington DC, lot size, square-footage of 
house - as well as an index for quality of construction, the age of the home at the sale data, and a 
                                                 
30 Pooled lagged sales prices from 2, 3, 4, and 5 years were also tested with remarkably consistent results in terms of 
the magnitude of variance. As one would expect the drift calculation stabilized and moved off zero as a mean value 
with the inclusion of more years.    27
dummy variable for townhouse. These covariates are represented by the W vector in equation 
(17) below.  
  A separate drift and variance value is calculated for each area of the county (defined by 
15 groups of Census tracts) and each year of the analysis (11 years from 1991 through 2001), by 
estimating 15 regressions for each year of the analysis, one for each Census tract. Thus the 
impact of the W variables on price is allowed to vary across the tracts and years within the 
county. To isolate the drift an implicit temporal effect for each tract is estimated. Specifically, for 
any analysis year t and census tract the following OLS regression was estimated: 
(17)          1,...15 n             in in in n n n i W lagyear deflatedSP     1 0 ) ln(
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where each regression included all qualifying sales for years t-1, t-2, and t-3. The variable 
deflatedSPi is defined as the inflation adjusted sales price in 2000 dollars for the i
th sale, and 
lagyeari equals s if the i
th sale took place in year t-4+s (s=1,2,3). A total of 165 regressions were 
estimated. The coefficient on (lagyear), n 1  , becomes the measure for the drift parameter for the 
n
th Census tract group and the t
th year of analysis of the regression.  
Real estate is an asset whose value can be attributed to observable parcel and house 
characteristics, and unobserved characteristics captured in the error term.  The empirical 
representation of the variance measure from the real options theory is based on this error term.  
The variance is defined as the sum of squared residuals: 
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2 k L deflatedSP deflatedSP n i in in   is a consistent estimate of 
expected sales price, Ln is the number of observations in tract n, and k is the number of 
regressors. This variance is calculated for each of the 165 regressions (15 tracts and 11 analysis 
years) in the dataset. This measure is standardized by dividing by the mean sales price in the 
respective tract and year.  The average drift for the entire sample is 0.645% and the average 
standard error is 16.75%. Large variances proxy for high levels of uncertainty in future expected 
returns to development.  Of course, few observations in a year can lead to a high variance - but   28
this is appropriate as it is a signal of the limited information on recent sales with which current 
landowners can develop their expectations.
31  
In summary, this analysis utilizes a rich dataset composed of time invariant and time 
varying attributes to estimate a data ‘hungry’ model of the timing of land conversion and 
preservation decisions. This model incorporates the dynamics inherent in the process of land use 
change that are often overlooked when estimating land conversion decisions.
32 
Empirical Implementation and Results 
A necessary step in evaluating the impact of the preservation option on the conversion 
decision in the competing risks framework is the selection of an appropriate baseline hazard 
specification and a specification for the unobserved heterogeneity. In subsequent sections, 
alternative distributional assumptions are explored by evaluating each risk individually and 
eliminating specifications via statistical tests, where possible, or heuristically eliminating 
specifications by evaluating parametric versus their non-parametric counterparts. This 
exploration leads to the selection of specifications that are then applied to the dependent 
competing risks model. 
Since there is no strong theoretical or empirical basis for assigning a particular form for 
the baseline hazard, a logical starting point for model selection is to determine if a time 
dependent baseline hazard is even necessary. Throughout this section the discussed models 
incorporate covariates as described in the data section. At this point in the model selection 
process the covariates are serving two purposes. First and foremost, they control for observable 
variation in parcels. But secondly, an examination of the differences in coefficient estimates 
across model specifications, from non-parametric to fully parametric, provides the researcher 
with an indication of sensitivity to the parametric assumptions imposed by each model.  
To determine if a time dependent baseline hazard is necessary a Weibull model, which 
allows a monotonic baseline, is compared with the exponential baseline, which has no 
dependency on time. Because the exponential is nested in the Weibull, a likelihood ratio test can 
                                                 
31 Specifications used in this analysis assume constant and homogeneous discount rates (ρ) across landowners, as 
data limitations preclude controlling for variation in landowner discount rates. The frailty specifications should 
remove some of the noise from this unobservable. 
32 In fact, many land use studies use the ‘current’ landscape as the source of data, failing to account for direct 
correlation among lots within any subdivision. A twenty lot subdivision does  not represent twenty different 
decisions, but only one decision.   29
be used. For the conversion hazard the null hypothesis of an exponential, “memoryless”, hazard 
is rejected in favor of a time dependent baseline at a critical level of less than 1% for the 
conversion hazard.
33 The same test “fails to reject” the null of an exponential baseline hazard for 
the preservation decision thus an exponential baseline will be specified for the preservation risk 
in the competing risks model. Full estimates for these models are given in table 3 and table 7.  
From these results it is evident that the conversion baseline hazard exhibits some duration 
dependency. Unfortunately, no statistical test exists for selecting between the monotonic baseline 
hazard models like the Weibull and Gompertz models because these models are not nested. 
However, viewing the baseline estimates from these models can provide insight on the “correct” 
model for the land conversion process. Figure 6 displays the baseline hazard estimate from the 
results for the Weibull and Gompertz baseline specifications.
34  The extreme curvature of the 
Weibull specification in the early periods is unconvincing in the land use context and is most 
likely an artifact of the Weibull’s behavior around time, t=0 ( Ridder and Woutersen, 2003).  It is 
not likely that parcels in 1991 have a very small baseline hazard rate which increases sharply at 
the outset of the study period as suggested by the Weibull distribution portrayed in Figure 6. This 
is especially true in this setting as the data for this analysis begins in 1991, not at the beginning 
of a parcel’s lifetime. It seems logical that the hazard rate at the beginning of the study period 
should be a non-zero rate. In comparison, the Gompertz specification allows the hazard rate to 
take non-zero values in the interval around t=0 and is also a monotonic hazard specification and 
thus is preferred to the Weibull. 
Having a nominee for a parametric baseline in hand is a start but one cannot be certain 
that this parametric specification is appropriate. A sensitivity analysis is performed by comparing 
coefficient estimates from fully parametric models against estimates from models that 
incorporate a semi-parametric baseline specification suggested by Meyer (1990) and models that 
abstract from the baseline hazard altogether (i.e. the Cox model).  If the pattern of coefficients’ 
signs and significance are similar across models, one can feel more comfortable with the 
parametric baseline specification.  
The semi-parametric approach uses the piecewise exponential specification and allows 
the resulting baseline to vary across pre-specified intervals of time. The baseline is allowed to 
                                                 
33 The null hypothesis is rejected using a likelihood ratio test, chi
2(1) = 10.69 which rejects the null at less than a 1 
percent significance level. 
34 Also included in Figure 4 are results from the exponential, which imposes a constant baseline hazard. These 
results are included for a comparison in scale.   30
vary freely from one time interval to another but is constant across observations within time 
intervals. The piecewise specification has the advantage of removing temporal unobserved 
heterogeneity not already represented by time varying covariates in the data. The piece-wise 
exponential baseline hazard is specified as: 







0    where  1  m   for  m m a t a   1  and = 0 otherwise. 
In equation 18, the  m a ’s represent a series of temporal breakpoints, and the hm’s represent 
the baseline hazard rates in each of the m intervals. This method is useful in validating an 
imposed parametric baseline because this semi-parametric approach allows the data to select the 
pattern of the baseline. If the semi-parametric baseline resembles the parametric baseline one 
may use the parametric baseline without reservation.
35  
Estimation of this model requires dividing the study period into time intervals which can 
be done in any of a number of ways, usually defined by calendar time or into intervals where an 
equal number of failures occur. The former method is implemented by allowing the baseline 
hazard to be constant over all observations within a calendar year but vary between years. 
However, splitting the data on calendar time puts different numbers of failure events and 
observations in each interval. The latter procedure of binning the data such that an equal number 
of failure events falls into each interval allows the data to ‘choose’ the interval width.  
Both approaches are considered in this analysis. Three bins are utilized for the binning 
approach and the resulting Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) statistic is compared across these 
three, as well as with a specification which incorporates yearly dummies.
36  The intervals for the 
binning approach are tested for 4, 6, and 8 bins, and the AIC values from these models are 2622, 
2620, and 2614 respectively. The AIC value using the calendar year approach is 2622. Figure 7 
displays the baseline hazard estimates from each of these models and includes the Gompertz 
baseline for comparison. From these interval based piecewise estimates, it is easy to see how a 
                                                 
35 The primary drawback of this estimator is the heavy influence of the last hm in prediction of future conversion 
times. 
36 Non-nested models such as the Weibull and Gompertz can be compared using the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC) proposed by Akaike (1974) defined as, 
) ( 2 ln 2 c k L AIC      
where lnL is the log-likelihood value, k is the number of covariates in the model, and c is the number of ancillary 
parameters. Although the best fitting model typically has the largest log likelihood, the AIC is designed to penalize 
models with excessive parameters. The most preferred model has the lowest AIC value.   
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few months of high conversion activity in the middle of the study period are picked up by the 
baseline hazard estimation. Though the AIC measures are very close the model with eight 
intervals is slightly preferred and thus for the remainder of this paper all references to the 
piecewise model will refer to the model with eight intervals grouped by the number of failure 
events. Alternatively, one could argue that the general pattern of the baseline estimates is flat or 
increasing in time, as in the Gompertz baseline, thus the Gompertz baseline specifications will be 
examined for the conversion risk as well. 
As a final check of the baseline specification one can heuristically validate the models by 
comparing the coefficient estimates against the non-parametric alternative, the Cox model. 
Loosely speaking, if there are dramatic differences in coefficient estimates between the non-
parametric and parametric baseline specifications, the imposition of the parametric baseline 
should be questioned further. If the coefficient estimates are not sensitive to the selection of the 
parametric model then the researcher can be more confident in the parametric specification. In 
both the conversion and preservation hazards the Cox models produce similar estimates to the 
parametric baselines and thus fail to invalidate the parametric restrictions imposed by the 
baseline specifications. The full set of coefficient estimates are given in tables 3 and 7 for the 
conversion and preservation risks, respectively. 
In summary, results from these baseline hazard specification tests for the conversion 
hazard suggest the use of a Gompertz parametric baseline may be appropriate, but it is probably 
best to consider the less parametric piecewise model, as well, as the primary focus of this 
analysis is on interpreting the coefficient estimates and not prediction of conversion times for 
censored parcels. Both representations of the conversion baseline will be estimated for the 
remainder of this paper for the conversion hazard. The preservation hazard will be specified with 
an exponential baseline. 
Unobserved Heterogeneity   
A second distributional assumption is required for each risk in order to implement the 
dependent competing risks model. This assumption pertains to the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Recall from equation 11 that the accepted way of including heterogeneity involves 
a multiplicative term added to the baseline proportional hazard specification which follows a 
known distribution and adds an estimated parameter for the variance of this distribution. There   32
are many distributions commonly used to represent individual specific unobserved heterogeneity 
and, as with the baseline specification, there is no a priori reason to choose one over another.  
Mimicking the approach taken to select the baseline hazard, I estimate the frailty 
parameter non-parametrically utilizing a finite mixture distribution as described by Heckman and 
Singer (1984), though the necessity of this non-parametric approach is questioned by Han and 
Hausman (1990).
37 In this case the finite mixture distribution takes the role of the Cox model, as 
validation that the distributional assumptions are not imposing excessive influence on the 
estimated coefficients. 
Tables 5 and 6 present results using Gamma, Log Normal, and finite mixture 
distributions to represent the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the parametric (Gompertz) 
and semi-parametric (piecewise exponential) forms of the conversion baseline hazard.
38  Two 
things are important to take away from these estimates – first, the heterogeneity parameters are 
significant in each specification, and second, the magnitude and significance of the estimated 
coefficients are remarkably stable across specifications implying the parametric heterogeneity 
performs no worse than non-parametric heterogeneity.  
By design, the heterogeneity distribution must be related across risks to facilitate 
estimation of the dependent competing risk model, so the preservation hazard is analyzed using 
the log normal unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
39 The last column in table 7 displays these 
results and again the heterogeneity parameter is significant and coefficient estimates are 
relatively stable. Based on these results a log normal distribution will be utilized for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the dependent competing risks model.   
                                                 
37 In fact, Han and Hausman suggest that non-parametrically estimating the baseline hazard absorbs some variation 
being picked up by the unobserved heterogeneity term in Heckman and Singer. They argue that the restrictive 
parametric baseline hazard imposed by Heckman and Singer is a contributing factor in the finding of influential 
unobserved heterogeneity. This suggests a potential tradeoff between a parametric restriction on the baseline versus 
a parametric restriction on the heterogeneity term. 
38 These distributions are selected for the unobserved heterogeneity parameter because a) the Gamma distribution is 
a popular choice in the existing literature, b) the log normal is more general than the Gamma parametric distribution 
in this context, and c) the finite mixture is non-parametric and can mimic many distributions (Weinke, et. Al. 2005; 
van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Ridder 1994). In fact, in the case of a single risk hazard model the piecewise 
exponential baseline with a finite mixture heterogeneity distribution is the least parametric full information 
maximum likelihood estimation that can be implemented.  Log normal distributions require numerical integration to 
evaluate the likelihood function. This is accomplished using a Gauss Hermite Quadrature with 24 integration points. 
39 Recall, the dependent competing risks model requires a bivariate distribution.   33
Competing Risks Model 
With a set of appropriate distributional assumptions in hand, the dependent competing 
risks model can now be estimated. A piecewise exponential baseline hazard and a Gompertz 
baseline hazard are considered in turn for the conversion risk, and an exponential baseline hazard 
is specified for the preservation risk. Both a log normal and a bivariate log normal are considered 
for the heterogeneity distribution. Specifically, a univariate log normal distribution restricts the 
heterogeneity parameter to be the same in each risk. This representation is consistent with a 
world where unobservables describe the landowner’s propensity to “move” or enter into some 
new land agreement (be it preservation or development). This may be the case where a financial 
situation requires the landowner either to sell the property or to sell an easement (i.e. enroll in the 
preservation program). The second parameterization of the heterogeneity utilizes a bivariate log 
normal distribution which allows heterogeneity to be present in each risk in different degrees and 
correlates the dependency across risks via a jointly estimated correlation parameter. This 
discussion will focus on the results from the bivariate case because the univariate case does not 
differ dramatically.  Both sets of results are given in table 8.  
Before discussing the coefficient estimates it is useful to view the resulting baseline 
hazard estimates for the conversion hazard that this model produces.
40  Figure 8 displays the 
conversion hazard using the piecewise exponential baseline, where an exponential baseline for 
the preservation hazard and bivariate heterogeneity are implemented. The semi-parametric 
baseline function from the competing risks model is similar in shape to the estimates from the 
single case but the magnitude is amplified. This difference in magnitudes is evident by 
comparing the difference in median conversion time by model. In the single risk case the median 
conversion time from the piecewise model with log normal heterogeneity is 33 years while the 
median conversion time is 24 years in the competing risks model.  
   Overall, the variables for unobserved heterogeneity within each risk are significant, 
similar to the single risk models. This suggests heterogeneity within risks exists and is indicative 
of the need to model these elements. However, the correlation between these unobserved 
components is not significant. This could be a consequence of the choice of the heterogeneity 
distribution, which may be incapable of detecting this competing risk correlation, or it may 
suggest that cross risk correlations are adequately captured by the variation in the observable 
                                                 
40 Recall that the preservation hazard is constant, resulting in an uninteresting graph of the baseline.   34
data. Unfortunately, these explanations cannot be validated. The competing risks model remains 
the most realistic model to mimic the real world decision process facing landowners in this study 
and will be utilized to discuss the coefficient estimates.  
Results 
The empirical model and data discussions include several covariates intended to control 
for differences in development profitability and preservation likelihood across parcels at risk. 
The discussion of the estimated coefficients begins with these covariates, not because these 
explanatory variables are themselves of central importance, but because plausible results in these 
controls provide support for interpretations with regard to the options variables.  
Variables are included in the model if they are likely to have a bearing on the returns 
from development, the construction costs of development, and/or the opportunity costs of 
converting a parcel to development. Also included are covariates that might alter the appeal of a 
parcel as an easement sale by the county. Explanatory variables that affect both the returns to 
development, as well as the ranking the county is likely to place on the parcel should it be 
offered for easement sale, include measures of surrounding land uses. Relative to the normalized 
category – developed residential land – several categories of surrounding land use have a 
depressing influence on development. Specifically, commercial and institutional neighbors 
appear to have a depressing effect on development likelihood, as does neighboring land that is 
developable or has been preserved – all relative to residential development. Only open space has 
a (relatively) positive effect as a neighbor on development, as do existing roads (that offer road 
frontage valuable for development).  
Other controls related to parcel location include the recent rate of new home construction 
measured by devRate which is positive and significant. This variable varies by block group and 
serves as a proxy for unobservables which influence the rate of construction and, indirectly, the 
approval rate of subdivisions in the neighborhood of each parcel. The rate of subdivision and 
thus new construction activity may be due to unobservables in the county planning office where 
development approvals may be based in part on some unpublished county prerogatives. This 
measure also proxies for attractive locations of the county based on unobservables that 
developers may perceive, but are not visible to researchers. As with other control variables that 
may relate to the spatial distribution of land conversion, direct interpretation of this variable as a 
policy relevant measure is not appropriate because this model is not designed to control for   35
selection issues which likely exist in placement of new conversions. See Irwin and Bockstael 
(2002) for a detailed discussion.  
Variables which represent the opportunity costs of development, including acreage and 
the presence of an existing house, are associated with significant coefficients. Larger parcels are 
more likely to convert at a rate of 3-4% more per acre.
41  The larger parcel is more likely to be a 
viable agricultural parcel but from the developer’s perspective a larger parcel is potentially a 
more attractive investment because the marginal costs are likely decreasing in the number of 
units, at least in construction costs. Administrative costs are likely to be fixed at least over ranges 
of subdivision project size, contributing to economics of scale even when these additional 
bureaucratic costs are included.  The presence of an existing structure significantly delays 
conversion and is either an opportunity cost, if the structure is viable in housing, or a 
construction cost, if the unit will need renovation or removal for the subdivision plan to proceed. 
Not surprisingly, the soil classification variables tell us little about the conversion decision, in 
part because soil quality impacts both agricultural returns and cost of development.  
As for other measures related to construction costs, land poorly suited for road 
construction or septic systems is found to impact conversion timing negatively, which implies 
developers may be leaving this land in the risk set longer while focusing on lands cheaper to 
convert.  A higher value for the percentage of the parcel with very steep slopes tends to delay the 
conversion decision. Although potentially producing views, steep slopes reduce the yield of units 
per parcel and increase the costs related to septic system placement, erosion control, and 
landscaping.  
Variables relating directly to the preservation hazard include parcel attributes that define 
qualification for the easement program. These include acreage and land use of the parcel itself, 
as well as surrounding land uses because parcels can qualify or receive preferential treatment 
based on the land uses of neighbors. Many of the estimated coefficients are in line with 
expectations. For example, acreage has a positive and significant effect suggesting larger parcels 
are more likely to preserve than remain in the status quo. Among the surrounding land uses 
preservation and developable land without a house increase the hazard of preservation.   
Other coefficients exhibit potentially counterintuitive results. For example, the 
percentages of land in good agricultural soil classes are significant and negative. However, 
                                                 
41 The variable Acres enters the model as observed acres divided by ten.   36
parcels with very good agricultural soils may represent viable agricultural operations with no 
financial need to encumber the land with a preservation easement. The program specific variable 
for funding is significant and positive as expected. This variable controls for the fact that parcels 
only enroll in years when funding is available. Finally, the presence of a house decreases the 
likelihood of preservation. This may seem counterintuitive unless one considers the family lot 
rules of the easement program. Based on the county’s rules, the landowner is allowed one family 
lot per 50 acres of preserved land. Consider a landowner who owns 105 acres, he may have less 
incentive to enroll because the family lot rule allows only one additional house.   
Results – Options Variables 
The variables of particular importance to this investigation are those associated with 
options – the two real options variables (drift and variance) and the dummy variable denoting the 
option to sell an easement. As presented in the theoretical section, the options pertaining to the 
fluctuation in housing prices, the drift and variance, should delay conversion decisions because 
the landowner will, in many cases, expect the return from waiting to be larger than the return to 
immediate conversion. Compared to a net present value model where conversion takes place 
when the development return is greater than the conversion cost, the options framework requires 
that development return exceed cost by some margin equivalent to the value of the option to 
develop in the future. In essence, an opportunity cost of development today is the foregone 
returns of development tomorrow at a potentially more advantageous price. Thus in areas where 
the variance in price is large, a landowner who includes current volatility into a forecast of the 
next period’s return may delay the conversion decision expecting an even better return in the 
next period. Similarly, for parcels qualified to enroll in a preservation easement, conversion 
today implies forfeiture of both the option to convert in the future and the option to preserve in 
the future. The expected result of a viable second option such as preservation is to delay 
conversion decisions.  
The coefficient related to the variance of the real option is consistently negative and 
significant across model specifications. A one percent increase in the price variation implies a 3 
percent reduction in the hazard rate of conversion and a one standard deviation change in 
variance implies a 15% reduction. These results accord with the comparative statics from the real 
options literature and suggest that price volatility increases the propensity of the landowner to   37
delay conversion decisions. The options variable related to the drift is consistently positive 
though never significant.  
The results pertaining to the second option are embodied in the estimated coefficient 
associated with easement eligibility (Easement). This coefficient is consistently negative and 
significant which suggests that preservation eligibility has an effect on the development decision 
and the effect is that of delaying development. The magnitude of this effect is better seen by 
taking the exponential of the coefficient, thus converting the coefficient to a hazard ratio.
42  In 
this case the hazard ratios range from 50 percent in the piecewise model to 55 percent in the 
Gompertz model, implying that the rate of conversion for easement eligible parcels is 
approximately 45% to 50% less than what might be expected without an easement program.  
The coefficient itself suggests the importance of the easement but the reduction in the 
hazard rate may not be extremely useful to policy makers as the connection between the hazard 
rate and actual time periods is not transparent. Table 9 reports the predicted median conversion 
times for censored parcels in the analysis, broken down by easement qualification and parcel 
size. The first four rows display the predicted outcome using the piecewise specification for the 
conversion baseline hazard which projects the value from the last interval of the piecewise model 
into the future. This is a potential drawback of the piecewise specification. The results presented 
in the last four rows of table 9 pertain to the Gompertz specification.  
Comparing the median conversion time across models for large parcels (>100 acres), the 
piecewise baseline competing risks model predicts median conversion time for the non-qualified 
parcels to be approximately 7.5 years and for the parcels qualified for the easement to be 
approximately 15 years. The Gompertz specification produces median conversion times of 14 
years (nonqualified) versus 23 years (qualified), for the same set of parcels. These large parcels 
are potentially the most interesting cases because they qualify for the easement without 
additional ‘help’ from adjacent parcels and because they yield the largest subdivisions and thus 
the greatest pressure on county services. However, differences in predicted conversion times 
persist over all size classes for both specifications and range from 7.43 to 27.67 for the piecewise 
baseline model and 9.05 to 17.87 for the Gompertz baseline model.   
                                                 
42 Strictly speaking, coefficients in unobserved heterogeneity models have the interpretation of hazard ratios only at 
t=0. As time progresses observations that are ‘ more frail’, as defined by the unobserved heterogeneity parameter, 
experience failure and are removed from the surviving population thus altering the distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity among parcels remaining the sample. This complicates the direct interpretation of the coefficients.   38
Figures 9 and 10 display histograms of predicted median conversion times by easement 
qualification where both graphs are scaled so the sum of the areas equals one. The graphs exhibit 
different shapes, due to the baseline specification, but the distributional difference between 
qualified and non-qualified parcels within each graph is apparent. The distribution of qualified 
parcels is shifted to the right compared to those not qualified. These results suggest that the 
existence of a preservation program, and thus the option to preserve, may actually slow 
development of eligible farmland even if that farmland eventually converts to residential use.  
Conclusion 
Modeling land conversion decisions is fraught with difficulties ranging from intensive 
data requirements to the appropriate choice of model structure. In many cases models to describe 
conversion decisions utilize aggregate data across time or space and place inappropriate 
restrictions on econometric specification.  
The analysis in this paper extends the current literature in at least two directions. First, it 
utilizes a spatially and temporally explicit micro-level data set to demonstrate how to solve 
several of the modeling/econometric problems that have plagued analysis of these types of 
behavior for some time. To this author’s knowledge this is the first paper to utilize a multi-state 
model in a land use context and the first to consider the impacts of unobserved heterogeneity in 
the conversion timing decision.  
Models which remove parametric restrictions and incorporate individual heterogeneity 
are proposed and estimated. These complex models closely resemble the choice set a landowner 
is faced with in the county under study and may generalize to counties with similar programs. 
Estimation of the dependent competing risks model produces coefficient estimates similar to less 
complicated models with non-parametric baseline specifications or multiplicative individual 
unobserved heterogeneity, but the framework for the competing risks model can serve as a 
building block to forecast conversion decisions. At a minimum, the dependent competing risks 
model validates heretofore assumed restrictions on the single risk models such as non-random 
censoring and the absence of length-biased sampling caused by individual unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
This paper also incorporates real options theory into the development decision modeling 
framework and finds that at least some of the theoretical predictions hold up in empirical work.   39
Although there is no consensus in the literature about the appropriate form of a land conversion 
model, this work supports an argument that rejects the net present value approach as an adequate 
representation of land conversion. As predicted by real options theory, price volatility is found to 
slow conversion rates in the competing risks models as well as single risk semi–parametric 
baseline models with and without heterogeneity. In addition, the existence of an alternative real 
option (preservation) is found also to slow conversion. 
The primary goal of this work was to determine if an easement option impacts conversion 
decisions, and, if so, to quantify the temporal impact of the option on landowners that do not 
preserve. With each model, from single risk to competing risk, negative and significant impacts 
on development from the existence of an easement option are found. The magnitude of the 
impact on the conversion rate ranges from a 45% to a 50% reduction in the conversion hazard. 
The less parametric and more realistic models produce the largest estimated impacts.  
This analysis finds empirical support for the predictions of the theoretical real options 
literature in terms of the effect of high price volatility and that of multiple options. However, one 
should be somewhat cautious in making ceteris paribus interpretations about some of the control 
variables in these models because, as in many land use analyses, there is much correlation among 
covariates.  Equally important, there is ample opportunity for endogeneity in the spatial 
landscape, as explained by Irwin (1998).  
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Figure 1:  Map of Study Area. 
 
 
Figure 2  Distribution of Preservation Enrollments.   46
Figure 3 Distribution of the “at risk” parcels 
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Figure 4 Distribution of preservation eligibility and activity 
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Figure 5 Distribution of conversion activity 
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Figure 8:  Competing Risks Piecewise Exponential Baseline Hazard, Conversion Risk. 
 
 
Figure 9:  Predicted Median Conversion Times from Piecewise Bivariate Heterogeneity Competing Risks for 
the Conversion Risk. 
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Figure 10:  Predicted Median Conversion Times from Gompertz Bivariate Heterogeneity Competing Risks 
for the Conversion Risk. 
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Table 1  Variables used in Competing Risks model, by Risk (or Hazard) 
Variables  Preservation Hazard  Conversion Hazard 
distBA x  X 
distDC x  x 
sluDevWithHs x  x 
sluDevNoHs x  x 
sluComm x  x 
sluSubdiv x  x 
sluPreserved x  x 
sluOpen x  x 
sluRoad x  x 
sluProtected x  x 
sluExempt x  x 
popDen   x 
numLots   x 
reqOpenSpace   x 
Funding x   
Opportunity costs 
class1 x  x 
class2 x  x 
class3 x  x 
class4 x  x 
Agriculture x  x 
Acres x  x 
hasHouse x  x 
Conversion costs 
Steep   x 
Forested   x 
notRoadSuit   x 
notSepticSuit   x 
sewerPlanned   x 
intRate   x 
Apfo   x 
Options variables 
Drift measure    x 
Variance measure    x 
Easement   x 
   53 
 
 
Table 2  Summary Statistics 
Variable Description  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Options Variables 
Easement*  Qualified for easement  0.093  0.287  0.000  1.000
Variance measure*  Standard error of sales price  16.751  5.695  8.022  30.909
Drift measure*  Drift in sales price  0.645  3.860  -11.025  11.831
Returns to Development 
distBA  Distance to Baltimore, in km   28.349  10.555  10.935  72.959
distDC  Distance to DC, in km  47.827  9.072  29.511  68.782
sluDevWithHs* 
% surrounding land use not fully developed 
with a house  17.451  19.651  0  96.169
sluDevNoHs* 
% surrounding land use not fully developed 
with a house  11.067  14.268  0  97.781
sluComm* 
% surrounding land use in commercial / 
institutional 3.669  9.087  0  75.369
sluSubdiv*  % surrounding land use subdivided    3.885  6.045  0  69.353
sluPreserved* 
% surrounding land use enrolled in 
preservation program  4.850  13.576  0  94.182
sluOpen*  % surrounding land use in openspace  2.676  6.987  0  93.385
sluRoad*  % surrounding land use in roads  11.028  10.904  0  71.265
sluProtected*  % surrounding land use in protected status  6.747  13.429  0  95.154
sluExempt*  % surrounding land use in tax exempt status  2.409  6.981  0  66.841
devRate* 
% of new construction added by block 
group 4.371  3.687  0  20.292
popDen  # households per acre by census tract, 1990  .538  .458  .069  2.363
numLots  # lots allowed per zoning regs  16.637  35.492  3  700
reqOpenSpace  =1 if open space required, 0 if no  .882  .322  0  1
Opportunity Costs 
class1  % of parcel with class 1 soils   1.177  4.824  0  66.971 
class2  % of parcel with class 2 soils  44.862  31.481  0  100 
class3  % of parcel with class 3 soils  32.234  28.986  0  100 
class4  % of parcel with class 4 soils  9.597  18.515  0  100 
Agriculture  % of parcel in crops  29.084  37.171  0  100 
Acres  Parcel size, in acres  2.231  3.844  .751  798.465 
hasHouse  existing house on parcel  .640  .480  0  1 
Construction Costs 
Steep  % of parcel with steep slopes  16.504  31.213  0  100 
forested  % of parcel in forest cover  36.695  36.650  0  100 
notRoadSuit  % of parcel not road suitable  43.952  30.413  0  100 
notSepticSuit  % of parcel not septic suitable  60.905  34.404  0  100 
sewerPlanned*  Sewer planned in next 10 years  .149  .357  0  1 
intRate*  Annualized 3 month T bill rate  4.55  .901  2.998  5.820 
APFO* 
=1 if restricted by adequate public 
facilities moratoria   .134  .341  0  1 
Number of observations  16,116(1756 parcels) 
* - Time varying covariate 
Sources:  Maryland Department of Planning; Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation; Howard County 
Department of Planning; U.S. Census Bureau   54 
 
Table 3: Parametric Baseline Hazard, Conversion Risk  
  Gompertz  Weibull   Exp   
Variables          
Options variables
Easement  -0.4855 **  -0.4549 *  -0.5123 ** 
Variance  measure  -0.0252 *  -0.0192   -0.0299 ** 
Drift  Measure  -0.0037   0.0072   -0.0042  
Development Returns
distDC  -0.0103   -0.0093   -0.0112 * 
distBA  0.0054   0.0052   0.0057  
sluDevWithHs  -0.0222 **  -0.0222 **  -0.0221 ** 
sluDevNoHs  -0.0114 **  -0.0102 **  -0.0120 ** 
sluComm  -0.0113 **  -0.0112 **  -0.0113 ** 
sluSubdiv  0.0095   0.0118 *  0.0082  
sluPreserved  -0.0201 **  -0.0206 **  -0.0198 ** 
sluOpen  0.0117   0.0117   0.0119 * 
sluRoad  0.0070 *  0.0075 *  0.0066  
sluProtected  -0.0002   -0.0001   -0.0002  
sluExempt  -0.0232 **  -0.0235 **  -0.0231 ** 
devRate  0.0497 **  0.0567 **  0.0459 ** 
popDen  0.1735   0.1993   0.1574  
numLots  0.0003   0.0005   0.0002  
reqOpenSpace  -0.1377   -0.1224   -0.1489  
Opportunity costs
class1  0.0107   0.0105   0.0110  
class2  0.0030   0.0030   0.0029  
class3  0.0010   0.0011   0.0009  
class4  0.0007   0.0009   0.0006  
agriculture  -0.0032   -0.0035   -0.0030  
Acres  0.2685 **  0.2676 **  0.2703 ** 
hasHouse  -0.9187 **  -0.9319 **  -0.9096 ** 
Conversion costs
steep  -0.0060 **  -0.0062 **  -0.0059 ** 
forested  -0.0015   -0.0016   -0.0015  
notRoadSuit  -0.0050 **  -0.0050 **  -0.0050 ** 
notSepticSuit  -0.0003   -0.0004   -0.0003  
sewerPlanned  -0.7178 **  -0.7045 **  -0.7392 ** 
intRate  -0.1253 **  -0.1333 **  -0.1098 ** 
apfo  -0.2014   -0.2564   -0.1375  
          
Constant  -4.2134 **  -5.1200 **  -4.7333 ** 
  0.0018   0.1636 **    
 **   - significant at 5%, *     - significant at 10%   55 
 
Table 4   Non/Semi Parametric Results, Conversion Risk 
Baseline specification  Cox  PW Exp   
     8  intervals   
Variables        
Options variables 
Easement -0.5277  ** -0.5289  ** 
Variance measure  -0.0259  ** -0.0265  * 
Drift Measure  0.0185    0.0093   
Development Returns 
distDC -0.0111  *  -0.0111  * 
distBA 0.0054    0.0054   
sluDevWithHs -0.0219  ** -0.0218  ** 
sluDevNoHs -0.0106  ** -0.0107  ** 
sluComm -0.0114  ** -0.0113  ** 
sluSubdiv 0.0108    0.0106   
sluPreserved -0.0203  ** -0.0201  ** 
sluOpen 0.0120  ** 0.0117   
sluRoad 0.0069    0.0068  * 
sluProtected -0.0003    -0.0002   
sluExempt -0.0237  ** -0.0235  ** 
devRate 0.0549  ** 0.0544  ** 
popDen 0.1880    0.1873   
numLots 0.0003    0.0003   
reqOpenSpace -0.1365    -0.1344   
Opportunity costs 
class1 0.0114    0.0113   
class2 0.0032    0.0032   
class3 0.0011    0.0011   
class4 0.0010    0.0010   
agriculture -0.0032  *  -0.0032   
acres 0.2745  ** 0.2737  ** 
hasHouse -0.9207  ** -0.9196  ** 
Conversion costs 
steep -0.0062  ** -0.0061  ** 
forested -0.0016    -0.0016   
notRoadSuit -0.0050  ** -0.0050  ** 
notSepticSuit -0.0005    -0.0005   
sewerPlanned -0.7655  ** -0.7625  ** 
intRate 0.3237    -0.0823   
Apfo -0.0388    -0.0459   
        
Constant     -4.7333  ** 
** - significant at 10%, * - significant at 5%   56 
 
Table 5  Gompertz specification with heterogeneity, Conversion Risk 
Baseline specification  Gompertz Gompertz Gompertz Gompertz 
Heterogeneity 
specification   Gamma  Log  Normal Finite  Mixture 
Options variables 
Easement  -0.4855 ** -0.5436 ** -0.6051 ** -0.5015  * 
Variance  measure  -0.0252  *  -0.0282 ** -0.0358 ** -0.0368 ** 
Drift  Measure  -0.0037  -0.0058  -0.0075  -0.0048  
Development returns 
distDC  -0.0103  -0.0097  -0.0116  -0.0117  * 
distBA  0.0054  0.0067  0.0061  0.0063  
sluDevWithHs  -0.0222 ** -0.0243 ** -0.0244 ** -0.0234 ** 
sluDevNoHs  -0.0114 ** -0.0130 ** -0.0145 ** -0.0134 ** 
sluComm  -0.0113 ** -0.0147 ** -0.0159 ** -0.0189 ** 
sluSubdiv  0.0095  0.0104  0.0099  0.0101  
sluPreserved  -0.0201 ** -0.0222 ** -0.0224 ** -0.0210 ** 
sluOpen  0.0117    0.0156 ** 0.0177 ** 0.0206 ** 
sluRoad  0.0070 * 0.0088 * 0.0099 * 0.0085 * 
sluProtected  -0.0002  0.0010  0.0014  0.0006  
sluExempt  -0.0232 ** -0.0244 ** -0.0248 ** -0.0247 ** 
devRate  0.0497 ** 0.0484 ** 0.0447 ** 0.0397 ** 
popDen  0.1735  0.2350  0.2164  0.2264  
numLots  0.0003  0.0008  0.0008  0.0022  ** 
reqOpenSpace  -0.1377  -0.1665  -0.1789  -0.1728  
Opportunity costs 
class1  0.0107  0.0109  0.0117  0.0136  
class2  0.0030  0.0024  0.0024  0.0020  
class3  0.0010  0.0006  0.0006  0.0002  
class4  0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0007  -0.0014  
agriculture  -0.0032  -0.0032  -0.0032  -0.0023  
Acres  0.2685 ** 0.3082 ** 0.3242 ** 0.2993 ** 
hasHouse  -0.9187 ** -0.9975 ** -1.0263 ** -0.9658 ** 
Conversion costs 
steep  -0.0060 ** -0.0070 ** -0.0071 ** -0.0069 ** 
forested  -0.0015  -0.0016  -0.0018  -0.0012  
notRoadSuit  -0.0050 ** -0.0056 ** -0.0057 ** -0.0057 ** 
notSepticSuit  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0001  
sewerPlanned  -0.7178 ** -0.7747 ** -0.8447 ** -0.8935 ** 
intRate  -0.1253 ** -0.1256 ** -0.1067  *  -0.1063  * 
apfo  -0.2014  -0.2148  -0.1246  -0.1273  
          
Constant  -4.2134 ** -4.2021 ** -4.1589 ** -6.1146 ** 
Shape  parameter  0.0018    0.0038 ** 0.0019    0.0007   
Heterogeneity 
parameter       .0.4789  **  0.8384  ** 
   
Fixed  point  1         -0.6000   
point  2         2.4612  ** 
Weight  1         -0.8648  ** 
** - significant at 5%, * - significant at 10%   57 
 
Table 6 Piece wise exponential models with Heterogeneity, Conversion Risk 
Baseline 
specification  PW Exp    PW Exp    PW Exp    PW Exp     
Variables      Gamma    Log Normal    Finite Mix     
Options variables  
Easement  -0.5289 ** -0.6050 **  -0.7247  **  -0.5645  **  
Variance  measure  -0.0265  *  -0.0298  ** -0.0358 **  -0.0358  **   
Drift Measure  0.0093    0.0081    -0.0192    -0.0170     
Development Returns  
distDC -0.0111  *  -0.0105    -0.0113    -0.0117     
distBA 0.0054    0.0066    0.0062    0.0058     
sluDevWithHs  -0.0218 ** -0.0239 **  -0.0262  **  -0.0234  **  
sluDevNoHs  -0.0107 ** -0.0122 **  -0.0160  **  -0.0133  **  
sluComm  -0.0113 ** -0.0148 **  -0.0184  **  -0.0189  **  
sluSubdiv 0.0106    0.0118    0.0122    0.0107    
sluPreserved  -0.0201 ** -0.0221 **  -0.0246  **  -0.0210  **  
sluOpen  0.0117    0.0160  ** 0.0197 **  0.0209  **   
sluRoad  0.0068 * 0.0088 *  0.0119  *  0.0087  *  
sluProtected -0.0002    0.0012    0.0019   0.0006     
sluExempt  -0.0235 ** -0.0246 **  -0.0268  **  -0.0246  **  
devRate  0.0544 ** 0.0535 **  0.0494  **  0.0423  **  
popDen 0.1873    0.2534    0.2649    0.2437     
numLots 0.0003    0.0008    0.0014    0.0021  *   
reqOpenSpace -0.1344    -0.1610    -0.1746   -0.1610    
       Opportunity costs  
class1  0.0113    0.0115   0.0113   0.0137    
class2  0.0032    0.0027   0.0022   0.0020    
class3  0.0011    0.0007   0.0004   0.0001    
class4  0.0010    0.0000   -0.0009   -0.0012    
agriculture  -0.0032    -0.0032   -0.0036   -0.0023    
acres  0.2737  **  0.3167  ** 0.3608 **  0.3072 **   
hasHouse  -0.9196  **  -1.0001  ** -1.1322 **  -0.9741 **   
Conversion costs  
steep  -0.0061  **  -0.0071  ** -0.0081 **  -0.0070 **   
forested  -0.0016    -0.0017   -0.0022   -0.0014    
notRoadSuit  -0.0050  **  -0.0056  ** -0.0063 **  -0.0057 **   
notSepticSuit -0.0005    -0.0003   -0.0006   -0.0002    
sewerPlanned  -0.7625  **  -0.8351  ** -0.9177 **  -0.9030 **   
intRate  -0.0823    -0.0875   -0.1418   -0.1396    
apfo  -0.0459    -0.0523   -0.0180   -0.0170    
                
Constant  -4.7333  **  -4.7035  ** -4.2616 **  -5.9036 **   
Heterogeneity parameters  
Heterogeneity 
parameter      0.4883  ** 1.0961 **       
Fixed point 1              -0.6000     
point 2              2.4255  **   
Weight 1              -0.8229  **   
** - significant at 5%, * - significant at 10%   58 
 
Table 7 Preservation Hazard – Exponential Baseline  
Preservation 




Funded     2.2576  **  2.4040  **  ^    1.7175  * 
Acres 0.0656  **  0.0667  **  0.0873  **  0.1258  ** 
distDC  0.0293   -0.0020   0.0019    0.0519   
distBA  -0.0049   0.0306   0.0357  *  -0.0089   
sluDevWithHs  -0.0061   -0.0077   -0.0048    -0.0130   
sluDevNoHs 0.0262  **  0.0279  **  0.0197  *  0.0197   
sluComm  0.0110   0.0122   0.0128    0.0006   
sluSubdiv  0.0198   0.0250   0.0126    -0.0078   
sluPreserved  0.0083   0.0064   0.0130    0.0134   
sluOpen  -1.5834  *  -1.5525   -1.8276   -2.5948  
sluRoad -0.0893  **  -0.0854  **  -0.0925  **  -0.1312  * 
sluProtected  -0.0288   -0.0275   -0.0231    -0.0431   
sluExempt  0.0024   0.0024   -0.0003    -0.0017   
class1     -0.0667  **  -0.0644  **  -0.0651  **  -0.0994  ** 
class2     -0.0986  **  -0.0946  **  -0.0919  **  -0.1372  ** 
class3     -0.0959  **  -0.0917  **  -0.0925  **  -0.1305  ** 
class4     -0.0607  **  -0.0584  **  -0.0628  **  -0.0931  ** 
steep      -0.0217    -0.0232    -0.0218    -0.0316   
forested  0.0289   0.0297   0.0254    0.0272   
agriculture 0.0457  *  0.0461  *  0.0401    0.0496   
hasHouse -2.3673  **  -2.3368  **  -2.1688  **  -3.2487  ** 
               
Preservation 
Constant -4.1289    -5.7950  *      -1.2830   
               
Heterogeneity  parameter        1.4451  ** 
           
Number of obs   =  257 (2009 observations) 
No. of failures =  59 
 ^ - does not vary over observations thus cancels out of Cox partial likelihood 
** - significant at 5%, * - significant at 10%   59 
 
 
Table 8  Competing risks models 









Log Normal   
Bivariate 
Log 
Normal    
Options variables  
Easement  -0.6969  ** -0.6860 **  -0.6139  ** -0.5884 **   
Variance 
measure  -0.0370  ** -0.0360 **  -0.0372  ** -0.0358 **   
Drift  Measure  -0.0187   -0.0184   -0.0086  -0.0069    
Development Returns  
distDC  -0.0112   -0.0114   -0.0115  -0.0116    
distBA  0.0059   0.0057   0.0060  0.0056    
sluDevWithHs  -0.0259  ** -0.0252 **  -0.0252  ** -0.0241 **   
sluDevNoHs  -0.0155  ** -0.0149 **  -0.0152  ** -0.0142 **   
sluComm  -0.0178  ** -0.0170 **  -0.0167  ** -0.0155 **   
sluSubdiv  0.0117   0.0114   0.0101  0.0099    
sluPreserved  -0.0220  ** -0.0222 **  -0.0216  ** -0.0210 **   
sluOpen  0.0192  ** 0.0185 **  0.0184  ** 0.0172 **   
sluRoad  0.0108  * 0.0105 *  0.0100  * 0.0093 *   
sluProtected  0.0018   0.0016   0.0015  0.0013    
sluExempt  -0.0263  ** -0.0257 **  -0.0256  ** -0.0248 **   
devRate  0.0493  ** 0.0486 **  0.0450  ** 0.0445 **   
popDen  0.2651   0.2514   0.2305  0.2110    
numLots  0.0009   0.0008   0.0007  0.0006    
reqOpenSpace -0.1506   -0.1587   -0.1638  -0.1625    
Opportunity costs  
class1  0.0128   0.0124   0.0126  0.0124    
class2  0.0023   0.0024   0.0023  0.0025    
class3  0.0004   0.0005   0.0005  0.0006    
class4  -0.0010   -0.0008   -0.0010  -0.0007    
agriculture  -0.0033   -0.0033   -0.0031  -0.0031    
acres  0.3560  ** 0.3454 **  0.3361  ** 0.3194 **   
hasHouse  -1.1357  ** -1.0890 **  -1.0816  ** -1.0275 **   
Conversion costs  
steep  -0.0080  ** -0.0076 **  -0.0075  ** -0.0070 **   
forested  -0.0021   -0.0020   -0.0019  -0.0018    
notRoadSuit  -0.0062  ** -0.0060 **  -0.0059  ** -0.0057 **   
notSepticSuit  -0.0005   -0.0004   -0.0003  -0.0003    
sewerPlanned  -0.9012  ** -0.8796 **  -0.8570  ** -0.8299 **   
intRate -0.1403    -0.1384    -0.1071  *  -0.1059  *   
Apfo  -0.0109   -0.0098   -0.1302  -0.1224    
              
Constant  -4.2218  ** -4.1436 **  -4.2109  ** -4.1207 **     60 
 
Table 8 Competing Risks Models, continued. 










Log Normal   
Bivariate 
Log 
Normal    
Funded 1.9142  **  1.7686  *  1.7994  *  1.9753  **   
Acres 0.1073  **  0.1229  **  0.1231  **  0.1011  **   
distDC  0.0409  0.0494  0.0497  0.0388    
distBA  -0.0096  -0.0096  -0.0095  -0.0091    
sluDevWithHs -0.0140  -0.0145  -0.0149  -0.0128    
sluDevNoHs  0.0166  0.0171  0.0169  0.0181    
sluComm  0.0030  0.0012  0.0015  0.0047    
sluSubdiv  0.0036   -0.0040  -0.0031  0.0061    
sluPreserved  0.0098  0.0125  0.0124  0.0094    
sluOpen  -2.9817  *  -2.9971  -3.0150  -2.7270  *   
sluRoad -0.1323  **  -0.1420  **  -0.1453  **  -0.1256  **   
sluProtected  -0.0369  -0.0416  -0.0412  -0.0358    
sluExempt  -0.0087  -0.0060  -0.0068  -0.0070    
class1 -0.0898  **  -0.1002  **  -0.1010  **  -0.0857  **   
class2 -0.1286  **  -0.1395  **  -0.1405  **  -0.1235  **   
class3 -0.1209  **  -0.1322  **  -0.1332  **  -0.1167  **   
class4 -0.0857  **  -0.0947  **  -0.0957  **  -0.0814  **   
Steep  -0.0323  *  -0.0336  -0.0340  -0.0302  *   
Forested  0.0203  0.0225  0.0219  0.0221    
agriculture  0.0417  0.0455  0.0449  0.0427    
hasHouse -2.9557  **  -3.2433  **  -3.2554  **  -2.8499  **   
            
Preservation 
Constant  -0.5404  -0.3136  -0.1851  -1.1328    
Heterogeneity Parameters   
Heterogeneity 
parameter 1  1.0961  **  1.4016  **  1.3994  **  0.9603  **   
Heterogeneity 
parameter 2      0.9865  **  0.7879  **       
Correlation     0.5318  0.6638        
* - significant at 10%, **   - significant at 5% 
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Table 9  Predicted Median Conversion Times (by Parcel size) 
Acres 
Qualify for 
Easement  Not Qualified for Ease  Difference 
PW Exp Baseline 
>100 acres  14.97  7.54  7.43 
75-100 acres  18.4  9.27  9.13 
50-75 acres  28.95  14.57  14.38 
25-50 acres  55.74  28.07  27.67 
Gompertz Baseline 
>100 acres  23.15  14.1  9.05 
75-100 acres  26.14  16.09  10.05 
50-75 acres  35.6  22.65  12.95 
25-50 acres  55.11  37.24  17.87 
Note:  All values in years and all ‘differences’ are significant at 5%.  62 
 
 
Appendix A:  The easement payout worksheet. 
Figure A.1: Payout formula 
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Appendix B: Data 
Table B.0.1 Data Sources 
Source Label 
1990 Census files(maps or data)  Census 
Howard County GIS  HC GIS 
Howard County Tax Assessment  HC Tax 
Howard County General Plan (1990)  HC GP 
Maryland Department of Transportation  MDT 
Maryland Department of Planning  MDP 
Natural Soils Maps (Natural Resources Conservation Services)  NRCS 
Soil Survey Geographic Database (NRCS & National Cartography and 
Geospatial Center, NCGC)  SSURGO 
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Table B.2 Variables and Sources 
Variable Source 
Easement  HC GIS, HC Tax 
Variance measure  HC GIS, HC Tax 
Drift measure  HC GIS, HC Tax 
distBA MDT   
distDC MDT   
sluDevWithHs  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluDevNoHs  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluComm  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluSubdiv  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluPreserved  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluOpen  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluRoad  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluProtected  HC GIS, HC Tax 
sluExempt  HC GIS, HC Tax 
devRate  HC Tax, Census 
popDen  HC Tax, Census 
numLots  HC Tax, MDP, HC GP 
reqOpenSpace  HC Tax,  HC GP 
class1  NRCS 
class2  NRCS 
class3  NRCS 
class4  NRCS 
Agriculture  MDP 
Acres  HC GIS, HC Tax 
hasHouse  HC GIS, HC Tax 
Steep  NRCS 
Forested  MDP 
notRoadSuit  SSURGO 
notSepticSuit  SSURGO 
sewerPlanned  MDP 
intRate  US Federal Reserve 
APFO  Howard County Council Legislative Record 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 